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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the feasibility
of population control in a democratizing developing world. The
extent to which past population control initiatives have
relied upon coercive measures to achieve program targets is
taken to have implications for the future of population
planning in a democratizing developing world. The urgency of
discerning the relationship between the independent variable
of coercion and the dependent variable of population control
is underscored by a discussion of the evidence for imminent
population-driven
political,
economic,
and
ecological
disruptions.
The three main theoretical frameworks of development
studies, institutional, cultural, and dependency/Marxist, are
examined for implications pertaining to the relationship
between coercion and population control.
These basic
frameworks are found to explicitly expect or tacitly imply a
role for political coercion in achieving population targets,
suggesting difficulty for maximizing the goals of population
control and democratization concurrently.
Analyses of population policy in India, China, Thailand,
and Japan, however, demonstrate that population control may be
achieved in an urbanizing and industrializing state through
strictly voluntary means, given long-term and consistent
governmental commitment to a comprehensive strategy for
reducing births and improving the status of women. This
finding, derived from time series data on population growth
rates, fertility rates, urbanization rates, and female
educational indicators, bodes well for the prospects of
population control in a democratizing developing world.
Further examination of the cases, though, illustrates that the
independent variables of urbanization/industrialization and
female empowerment influence population growth rates and
fertility rates in the longer term, while coercive policy
measures have utility for realizing rapid and notable
reductions in these indicators. Nevertheless, the case data
also suggest that in addition to the difficulties a coercive
strategy will encounter in a democratizing environment,
coercion may also be impracticable as a long-term or permanent
strategy.
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THE ROLE OF COERCION IN POPULATION PLANNING:
THE EVIDENCE FROM FOUR ASIAN STATES

Population issues have returned to prominence on the
international agenda, as seen in Cairo last summer. Population
planning has attained this newfound prominence, however, in an
era of profound political transformations. The march of modern
information technology and the seeming triumph of Western
socio-political
suggest

that

arrangements

in

authoritarian

the

international

political

system

institutions

and

practices are increasingly untenable in the modern world. In
this

analysis,

I

address

the

question

of

whether

the

resolution of the global population problem will be hindered
by the ascendancy of democratic values in the post-Cold War
international system. Toward this end, I will be examining the
extent to which successful population control initiatives in
China,

India,

Thailand,

and Japan have hinged upon using

coercive tactics to achieve population targets.

By using

qualitative and quantitative data, I will ascertain the extent
to

which

determined

an

independent

population

Consideration

will

variable,

growth

also

be

political

rates

and

given

to

coercion,

fertility
other

rates.1

independent

hereafter the independent variable "political coercion"
(or more generally, "coercion") is taken to refer to such
authoritarian tactics as involuntary sterilization, mandatory
abortion, and "recruitment" of individuals for family planning
measures through forcible roundups or raids. The presence of
any one of these phenomena, or more, is taken to be "political
coercion" for the purposes of this analysis.
2

variables (such as urbanization, structural characteristics of
the

population

programs,

and

empowerment

of

the

female

population) that could affect population indicators.
The forces of democratization, of course, make coercion
a less viable strategy for controlling population numbers in
any state. While the data indicate that coercion has been— at
the least— a sufficient condition for dramatic short-term
decreases in population growth rates, they also suggest that
states can have both democratic institutions and reap the
benefits of population planning, if several conditions hold.
The case analyses which I examine suggest that the population
bomb may be defused voluntarily in an urbanizing state, given
a consistent and long-term governmental commitment to

(1)

population planning and (2) improving the status of women.
Indeed,

given

population momentum

and

the

apparent

time

requirements of success with voluntary measures, I venture to
suggest that a cautionary note is in order for those who hold
unrealistic expectations about voluntary measures as a "quick
fix" for the population problem. Finally, although coercive
measures are found to have practical effect in attaining rapid
reductions in population growth rates and fertility rates,
consideration will also be given to the possible limitations
of using coercion to achieve program targets. Coercion, it is
found, may be an unsustainable practice over the longer term,
even if one sets aside the normative issues of democratiza
tion.

4

Malthus: Nov more than Ever
Why population control become such a salient policy area?
Alarm about population growth rates stems from evidence that
the world has unwittingly stepped into a modern-day Malthusian
Trap. Many of today's events appear to confirm a logic first
put forward by the English economist Thomas Robert Malthus at
the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:
Assuming, then, my postulata granted, I say,
that the power of population is indefinitely
greater than the power in the earth to produce
subsistence for man.
Population, when unchecked, increases in a
geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an
arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with the
numbers will show the immensity of the first power
over the second.
By the law of our nature which makes food
necessary to the life of man, the effects of these
two unequal powers must be kept equal.
This implies a strong and constantly operating
check on population from the difficulty of
subsistence. The difficulty must fall some where,
and must necessarily be felt by a large
portion of mankind. . .2
Should no preventive strategies be enacted to control
population growth (namely, self-control and delayed marriage) ,
Malthus argued that "positive checks" of warfare, famine, and
disease would place limits on population numbers. Other social
scientists

and

analysts

of

the population

question have

derided the mathematics that undergird this argument. Indeed,
the history of his own era might suggest that Malthus was a
crank:

in

the

nineteenth

century,

improvements

in

2Thomas Malthus, An Essav On the Principle of Population.
World's Classics Series (New York, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), 13.
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transportation, agriculture, and the development of the New
World yielded an increased food supply.3 No "positive checks”
emerged to place limits on population numbers. Nor were any
needed.
Yet

it may be

in our own era— at the

cusp

of the

millennia and toward the middle of the next century— that we
see the Malthusian logic, however unfortunately, validated.
The

independent

ecological,

variable

political,

population numbers,

behind

many

of

our

and economic dilemmas

just as the Rev.

current

seems to be

Malthus would have

maintained.
According to the

intellectual heirs of Malthus,

the

problems that correlate with ever-increasing population go
beyond

warfare,

famine,

and

disease.

The

neo-Malthur.ian

argument now encompasses the additional issues of mineral
resource scarcity, unprecedented environmental degradation,
the sustainability of development in the Third World,

and

(possibly) the sustainability of industrial civilization on
Earth. Some argue that the modern Malthusian arguments are no
more tenable in our era than Malthus1 were in his own time. In
looking

at

scientist,

the

numbers,

politician,

however,
"man

in

I doubt
the

anyone— social

street"— can

argue

convincingly that the world's current population growth rate,
if unchecked, will produce no noticeable effects on life on

3Rondo Cameron, A Concise Economic History of' the World
(New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 192.

Earth. Instead, I argue that while the scope of the effects of
rapid population growth may be open to debate,

even the

possibility

make

of major

disruptions

is

enough

to

one

question whether ignoring population growth is an intelligent
strategy.

The Population Bomb;
In

Ticking Louder Still...

1800, world population had just surpassed one billion

people. Between 1800 and the Great Depression (13 0 years),
this

figure doubled.

By

1992

(a short

sixty-three years

later) , there were 5.5 billion people on Earth. At the turn of
the millennia the Earth will be supporting 6.4 billion human
beings. Most demographic extrapolations predict a 2100 world
population somewhere between 7.5 and 14.2 billion.4
The lower-bound projection may not be alarming to the
unconvinced, as it anticipates only an additional 2.0 billion
people between now and 2100.

The upper-bound projection,

however, might disturb many of those skeptics unfazed by the
lower-bound figures. Even they might have to admit that the
effects of an additional 7.8 billion people placing demands
upon the Earth's resource base by 2100 is cause for concern,
as 7.8 billion is more people than currently inhabit the
Earth.

4Thomas W. Merrick with Staff of the Population Reference
Bureau, "World Population in Transition," Pooulatibn Bulletin
Volume 41 Number 2 (April 1986), 14.
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This more than doubling of the Earth's population could
have catastrophic effects.

Particularly disturbing is the

possibility that these effects might mutually reinforce each
other, creating a doomsday spiral of neo-Malthusian horrors:
it

is

entirely

possible

that

we

may

live

to

see

an

increasingly hungry, diseased, and volatile (both ecologically
and politically) world. The developed world might be able to
ignore the early symptoms of the population crisis, which may
appear first in the developing world. Early symptoms of what
is

to

come

atmospheric

conceivably
pollution

include

a

massive

from the burning

of

expansion
fossil

of

fuels,

skyrocketing reports of AIDS (accompanied by other, "older"
plagues), and a prevalence of famine from the farming of
unsustainable land. Yet, in an interdependent world, few or
none of these problems will be contained by traditional state
borders. To bank on fertilizers (with their own negative side
effects), miracle vaccines, and alternative energy sources
(plausible in the developed world, less so for the developing
world), and other technological quick-fixes of "progress"
(i.e., space colonization) to solve population-driven crises
seems innocent, given the magnitude of the population growth
discussed above. Costs to political systems could be huge, and
we might expect to see more unprecedented political problems
arise. For instance, what happens in a world of 15 billion
when a state devastated by population-related ills (shortages,
famine, disease, little sustainable land) holds in its hands

a nuclear card? A worOld of 15 billion would probably have a
much more tumultuous political environment— even if it never
comes to nuclear blackmail.

Democracy1s Ascendancy
If these

phenomena

are population-driven,

then the

obvious solution is to control population numbers. At the
macro level, the international system has a stake in warding
off global crisis. On the other hand, the constituent states
of

the

international

system— particularly

those

of

the

developing world— have other motivations to contain population
growth. Third World states often find that population-driven
ills (resource shortages, famine, disease) undercut gains that
would

otherwise

development.
development

be

Indeed,
have

been

realized
the
the

goals

in
of

primary

economic
economic

and

social

and

social

motivations

to

enact

population planning policies in the four states considered
here.
While population momentum presses the developing world,
so too does the ideological force of democratization. Since
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Communist regimes
in Eastern Europe and the eventual disintegration of the
Soviet Union into a "Commonwealth of Independent States,"
democracy (with its ubiquitous companion, the free market) has
emerged as the predominant political paradigm. Of course, the
discrediting of centrally-planned and authoritarian models of

9

governance has not meant an easy and immediate worldwide
transition to democracy and open markets. Nevertheless, an
increasing

number

of

actors

now

evaluate

the

worth

of

political systems— and political leaderships— using democracy
and open markets as the basic standards of judgement.
Thus the looming population question discussed above has
been

inherited

increasingly

by

Third

pressured— by

World
their

governments
own

that

citizens,

by

are
other

states, by interdependence itself— to adopt the liberal norms
of Western political arrangements. If the success of these
population programs in the past has hinged upon the use of
coercive tactics to meet program targets, then the Third World
states of today, influenced by a democratizing environment,
may have difficulty in controlling their population growth.
Furthermore, if coercion has been a critical ingredient of the
population policies of these states, then defusing the global
population

bomb

in

a

democratizing

environment

will

be

difficult.

Coercion. Population Planning, and the
Development Literature
Population control is essentially a development issue,
and development, of course, has been a major preoccupation of
policy-makers and the discipline of comparative politics since
the end of World War II. Indeed, the emergence of Third World
and

the

Warsaw

Pact

states

rattled

some

of

the

latent

assumptions of the comparative discipline. Prior to the post-

10

War

era,

comparative

politics

had

remained

largely

descriptive, normative, and legalistic endeavor.5
many of the tools comparativists had used

a

As such,

(e.g., studying

constitutions, legislatures) to analyze political systems were
not helpful in assessing the question of development.
Three main arguments,
discerned

in

the

or groups of arguments, may be

post-War

literature

on

Third

World

development. Instead of examining the merits of the three as
theory, I am content to discern what the arguments imply about
the role of political coercion in population control: inasmuch
as they speak to the issue of population planning, do they
suggest

that

political

coercion will

be

a

necessary

or

sufficient precondition for controlling population growth in
the developing world? If the main frameworks of development
studies persuade one to expect that population control will be
accompanied by coercion, then one has more reason to expect
difficulties

in controlling population growth

in today*s

democratizing world. The three approaches to the development
questions considered here are the institutional, cultural, and
dependency/Marxist arguments.

5Lawrence C. Mayer, Redefining Comparative Politics:
Promise Versus Performance. Volume 173, Sage Library of Social
Research Series (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publicatibns, 1989),
67.
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Institutions
As advanced by Samuel P. Huntington, the institutional
argument speaks mainly to political development, which is not
to be confused (in this case) with democratization. For him,
the key concept is mobilization,
relevant

in which the politically

strata of a state*s population expands greatly.

Increased mobilization walks hand-in-hand with modernization,
which

brings

a

developing

state

higher

literacy

rates,

increased exposure to mass media, and increased urbanization.
A modernizing society thus produces a mobilized populace? the
number and sophistication of those who make demands upon
political institutions multiplies. The danger to a modernizing
society is that this increasingly-mobilized populace will
overwhelm fragile political

institutions with demands for

scarce resources and services.
situation

of

political

decay

This,

in turn,

rather

than

produces a
political

development. Political development is the converse, equated,
of course, with strong, adaptable institutions.6
Taking steps to decrease mobilization while building
strong institutions is one way out of this dilemma. Such steps
could include limiting mass communication or discouraging
competition among groups, as was done in developing states
such as

Singapore and South Korea.

However,

this

itself

suggests that Huntington's fundamental concern is to maximize
6Please see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Societies (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 'University
Press, 1968).
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order. Order, from the perspective of this argument is the
main

precondition

to

any

kind

of

development,

whether

political or economic.
Thus

the

institutional

development

does

not

controlling

population

speak

argument

about

directly

numbers,

nor

to

to

Third

the

the

World

issue

of

necessity

of

coercion. When considered, though, the Huntingtonian logic
would allow that population control
extreme

measure

for

mobilization crisis.

dealing

is,

with

in fact,

the

a most

modernization-

If modernization brings mobilization,

which left unchecked strains the capacities of weak political
institutions, then a restrictive population policy is the most
comprehensive means to limit the number of potential demandmakers

in

a

^tate.

If

the

economy

may

be

grown

and

institutions strengthened over time, both would be less likely
overtaken .by a mobilized citizenry:

there would be fewer

people, and thus fewer mobilized people.
Thus one sees that the institutional logic allows a role
for population planning,

even though Huntington does not

address the issue directly. It is also silent on the issue of
coercion,

but given the institutional

concern with order over "justice,"

logic*s

fundamental

it cannot be said to

disallow coercive measures if population control would assist
in slowing mobilization.7 On the other hand,

if coercive

7Huntington readily admits his partiality for "political
stability," or order, in his Preface. Please see Huntington,
vii.
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measures

would

disorder,

then

increase
this

discontent,

logic

would

demand-making,

suggest

that

they

and
are

3

* counterproductive.

Culture
Like the institutional approach, a cultural approach to
the development question suggests that Third World states have
challenges
however,

along the path to development.

the determinative

In this view,

factor is the shared cultural

traits, norms, and values found among the people who reside in
a state or a region.
Christopher Clapham argues that what links the states
of the Third World is their neopatrimonial culture, in which
rational-legal

structures inherited from a colonial power

overlay a grid of lord-vassal relationships from a traditional
patrimonial system. The result is a patron-client state where
corruption and patronage are endemic, making allocations of
resources

inefficient

place). This

behavior

(e.g. , the road goes
is

accepted

by

the

to the wrong
neopatrimonial

culture and "condemned only so far in as it benefits someone
else

rather

Lawrence

E.

than

oneself."8 Culture

Harrison

as

the

is

main

also

advanced by

explanation

for

underdevelopment. Though he concentrates on Latin America, he

8Christopher
Clapham,
Third
World
Politics:
An
Introduction (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1985), 49.
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notes how the cultural argument may be applied to other
regions as well.9 The traditional Latin American culture,
Harrison

wants

to

prove,

creates

an

inertia

that

makes

development difficult. He argues that the states in Latin
America that escaped mainstream Latin American culture through
historical
"developed"

and

cultural

according

circumstance

to

important

are

also

economic

the

and

most

social

indicators. The states that did not escape that culture have
a

laundry-list

of

traits

(he's

careful

not

to

say

deficiencies) that retard development, including several that
resemble

conceptually

Clapham's

understanding

of

neopatrimonialism.10
As argued by these comparative scholars, the cultural
logic (as with the institutional one above) does not speak
directly to the issue of population planning. Both analysts
emphasize particular cultural traits that must be overcome in
order to achieve "development." Yet by locating the explicans
in culture, the cultural logic touches upon a critical issue
in population planning. Population control policies in China
and India,

for instance,

have been paired with extensive

socialization efforts designed to inculcate a new set of
values. In doing so, the Indian and Chinese governments are

9Please see Lawrence E. Harrison, Underdevelopment is a
State of Mind (Lanham, Maryland: The Harvard University Center
for International Affairs and the University Press of America,
1985).
10Ibid, 146.
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attempting to overcome the cultural inertia that permits or
often values large families.
Thus, on the subject of population planning, a cultural
logic does not exclude the possibility that the value placed
upon large families is another development-hindering cultural
trait. Furthermore, by positing causality in culture, which
should

normally

be

resistant

to

easy

manipulation,

the

cultural argument anticipates a role for political coercion in
achieving targets set by a population plan.

Dependency and Marxist Arguments
The dependency argument has a lineage that extends back
to the Marxist-Leninist critique of international politics.
Furthermore, the forefathers of this approach, Marx and Engels
had some very choice criticisms reserved for Malthus, whom
they regarded as a bourgeois sycophant.11
The dependency logic suggests (true to its heritage)
that development in the Third World is made impossible given
that

states there are systematically impoverished by the

international capitalist economic system. The main players in
the international capitalist system are the developed core
(the

West

and

other

industrialized

states)

and

the

underdeveloped periphery (the Third World). The systematic

11Frederick Engels, "The Condition of the Working Class
in England in 1844," chapter 3 in Marx and Engels on the
Popu1ation Bomb. ed. Ronald L. Meek (Berkeley, California:
Ramparts Press, 1971), 70-71.
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impoverishment

of

the

Third

World

is

portrayed

as

the

inevitable result of the international capitalist system: the
core imports raw materials bought at low prices from the
periphery, and the periphery buys the finished products (made
from the raw materials) back at a higher price. This uneven
transfer is accomplished by the multinational corporations of
the

capitalist

economies

With

the

collaboration

of

the

dominant elite class in a Third World country. The "comprador"
elite has economic interests in common with the elite of the
core

states

and

their

colleagues

in

the

multinational

corporations (MNCs).12
As the problems of underdevelopment and impoverishment
in the developing world are wholly results of an international
economic system, so too is the "population problem" created
that system. The population problem (which the political and
economic institutions of the developed world— or core— now
need to "control")

is twofold:

The nascent core states

exported "death control" technologies

(modern medicine)

to

their overseas territories and colonies (which later became
"the, developing world"), but refused to invest in industrial
job-creation technology in those same territories, preferring
instead to keep these areas as captive providers of raw
materials. When international capitalism did finally invest in
these territories, it brought in "overdeveloped" technology
12Tony Smith, "The Dependency Approach," in New Directions
in Comparative Politics, ed. Howard Wiarda (Boulder\ Colorado:
Westview Press, 1990), 124.
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"perhaps a bit too backward for serious competition with [the
capitalist states'] production but always too advanced and
capital-intensive to give much work to idle hands,"13 Thus,
between "death control" and "disemployment," the developed
world has created the so-called population problem, and needs
to

eliminate

the

resultant

people,

who

are

a

waste

(economically) and a potential threat (politically).

Implications of the Development Literature
Clearly,
development

of
in

the
the

three
Third

main
World,

approaches
the

to

studying

Marxist/dependency

conceptual framework is the one that most directly addresses
population control as a development issue, but it does so by
dismissing the need for such policies as chimerical. It also
readily

suggests

that

coercion will

be

used

to

achieve

decreased population growth rates, with the core states acting
through their comprador agents to eliminate the

"excess"

people. However, as we shall see, Maoist China's leadership
(hardly "comprador" agents)

has generally seen population

control— far from being a plot of the developed West— as
necessary to attaining its own development goals. An analyst
(and,

presumably,

pressed

to

the Chinese

understand

the

leadership)

role

of

would be hard-

coercion

in

Chinese

population policies as driven by international capitalism;
thus one should question the Marxist/dependency assertion that
13 Steve Weissman, forward in Meek, xvii.
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the need for population control is essentially chimerical.14
This brief survey has indicated that the cultural and
I institutional

conceptual

frameworks

do

not

address

the

population issue directly. On the other hand, by applying
their respective logics to the issue of population control,
one sees that either argument may lead an observer to expect
instances of coercive policy. By placing causality in culture,
the

former

resistance

immediately raises
to

population

the

planning.

specter
Faced

of

cultural

with

cultural

inertia, a regime bent upon achieving development goals may
have to resort to coercive tactics to effect dramatic change
in population growth rates. The institutional logic, on the
other

hand,

underscores why

a regime may

feel

that

its

development goals hinge upon solving the population problem:
fewer people mean mobilized demand-makers are less likely to
overwhelm the regime's capacity to deliver the benefits of
"development."

Four Population Planning Initiatives Assessed
We

have

seen

above

that

the

issue

of

coercion

and

population control is worth examination in political science,
given

the

ascendancy

of

democratization

and

market

14A more detailed discussion of the Chinese leadership's
attitude toward population planning is forthcoming below.
Population planning has
indeed been
a hotly-debated
ideological issue among the PRC's elite, but for most of the
last twenty-odd years debate has centered upon how rigorous
population policy should be, instead of whetherrto have a
policy.
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liberalization over authoritarian and central planning models
of governance. Moreover, I have surveyed the population issue
from the perspective of the three predominant approaches to
development,

each

of

which

suggested— or

allowed— that

coercive tactics would be employed in meeting population
targets.

The

development

literature,

then,

implies

difficulties for regimes attempting to maximize the goals of
population planning and democratization concurrently.
Now
several

I turn my discussion toward the assessment
case

studies:

the

population

policies

of

of
the

governments of China, India, Thailand, and Japan. Since World
War II, each of these governments has embraced population
planning, generally undeterred by anti-Malthusian arguments.
Perhaps more persuasive than the anti-Malthusian arguments has
been

the

evidence

that

population

growth

rates

in

the

developing world outpace what the rates of today's developed
states

were

at

comparable

income

levels.15

Fearful

of

population growth rates undercutting what otherwise would have
been economic and social development— and perhaps political
development,

if existing governing institutions were to be

overwhelmed

by

demands

by

an

governments

of

India,

China,

ever-growing
Thailand,

populace— the

and

Japan

have

responded with policies of population planning.
I will

first present brief histories of population

15John R. Weeks, Population: An Introduction to Concepts
and Issues
(Berkeley,
California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1981), 348.
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policy in China, a modernizing authoritarian regime? in India,
one

of

the

few

developing

states

that

has

maintained

democratic government since independence (save for the 19751977 Emergency period); in Japan, whose nascent democratic
state needed much

"re-development,” in the political

and

economic upheavals engendered by World War II*s aftermath? and
in Thailand,

which,

like many developing states,

has had

trouble sustaining democratic institutions in the post-war
period. My intention in these sections is to document the
evolution of these policies,

with particular reference to

coercive interludes: such documentation will provide a context
to the quantitative analysis. There, I will correlate reports
of coercive tactics with annual data from the four states,
assessing the role coercion played in controlling population
momentum, and the how other variables may have contributed to
braking this momentum.

Generally User-Friendlv: India's Policy
Shortly

after

Independence,

Commission was appointed

a

centralized

Planning

in India to develop a plan

for

balanced and effective use of natural resources to speed
economic development. The Commission*s First Five Year Plan
(1951-56) recognized that reasonable family planning measures
would

be

an

important

determinant

in

speeding

economic

21

development.16

However, in this early phase the government

moved cautiously:

the exercise remained largely an academic

and experimental one.17

Even so,

21 rural and 12 6 urban

family planning clinics were opened during this period.18
The
expanded

Second
the

Five-Year
"clinical”

Plan

(1956-1961)

approach

to

continued

family

and

planning;

authorities expected that people would avail themselves of
clinic services. Not as successful as expected, this approach
gave way to a "community extension" strategy in 1963, midway
through the Third Five Year Plan. The idea was to provide
family planning services close to people's homes through an
enlarged network of primary health centers while conducting an
intense educational campaign to lift taboos on open discussion
of family planning.19
The

next

several

years

brought

great

changes

to

population control measures in India. In 1965, the IUD gained
prominence, hailed as the "one cure" to family planning.20
Shortly thereafter,

in 1966, the government established a

full-fledged Department of Health and Family Planning to
16Mahendra K. Premi, The Demographic Situation in India.
No. 80, Papers of the East-West Population Institute Series
(Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Population Institute Press,
1982), 54.
17Georgia Lee Kangas, Population Dilemma: India's Struggle
for Survival (New Delhi, India: Mayfair Press, 1985), 98.
18Premi, 54.
19Ibid.

20Kangas,

105.
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administer the population control program, under both timebound

and

target-oriented

goals.21

This

specificity

of

targets and time-frame, combined with the "one-cure” approach,
seems to have set the stage for the excesses of the Emergency
period.
In the years immediately prior to Indira Ghandi's 1975
Emergency

proclamation,

sterilization

(tubectomy

and

especially vasectomy) had become the “one-cure” approach to
population control in India. Modeled on a successful program
in Kerala State, sterilization centers and mobile units became
common across India.22 The Center built cash incentives into
the program, and many states added negative incentives such as
preventing

families

with

more

than

three

receiving educational or food benefits.23

children

from

In the atmosphere

of the Emergency, obsessiveness about meeting the centrallyset targets filtered down from the Center to the state and
local authorities. Rumors recounted raids on villages by local
officials

and

compulsory

roundups

of

untouchables, the uneducated, and Muslims.24
the Emergency period,

the

poor,

the

Furthermore, in

much of the government’s own civil

21Premi, 55.
22Ibid. , 56.
23Kangas, 115, 120.

24Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., and Stanley A. Kochanek,
India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation
(Washington, D.C.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers,
1986), 218.
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service was alienated when promotions were made contingent
upon proof of sterilization.25
elections in 1977,

When Indira Ghandi called

the damage had been done to both the

population control program and the Congress Party. The Janata
Party and its allies exploited the issue— as well as other
arbitrary abuses of power during the Emergency— and took 33 0
of 542 Parliamentary seats, promising to downsize and reorient
the population program around strictly voluntary measures.26
Indira Ghandi, upon her return to government in 1980,
raised the family planning budget in the Sixth Five Year Plan
(1980-1985) over its Janata levels— but it still remained a
smaller percentage of the total development budget ,than it had
been from 1969 to 1977.27 Indian population policy:has since
emphasized voluntary family planning. The current state and
prospects of the population control program is captured in the
words of one recent commentator:
"If we really succeed in [population control], India
will. . . do so by adopting [a] voluntary family planning
programme."28

25Gayl D. Ness and Hirofumi Ando, The Land is Shrinking:
Population Planning in Asia (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1984), 8 8 .
26Ibid., 220, and Kangas, 176.
27Kangas, 126.

28Mamata Lakshmanna, Population Control and Family
Planning in India (Maujpur, Delhi, India: Discovery Publishing
House, 1988), 11.
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Slave to (Ideological^ Fashion:

China's Policy

In the early years after the Revolution, the Chinese
Communist Party was most interested in rehabilitating a wardamaged economy and had a tendency to believe,
Chinese, the better."29

"the more

Thus no population control policy

was promulgated in the early days of the PRC, despite China's
high birth rate and now lower-than-ever death rates. Policies
and propaganda indicated that the building of socialism in
China would both require and provide for as many Chinese as
possible.30
By 1953, the new regime had second thoughts— it found
that population pressure had undercut improvements in living
standards, education, housing, and medical care. That year,
the Government Administrative Council,

predecessor to the

State Council, instructed local health authorities to help the
public with contraceptive measures,

and it simultaneously

eased restrictions on abortion. In 1957, Mao Zedong himself
issued

a

statement

supportive

of

population

control.31

Shortly thereafter, in the disruptions engendered by the Great
Leap Forward, a reaction to the population program began. In
this

new

ascendancy

of

"leftist"

population

theory,

the

message "the more, the better" was again emphasized to the
29Hou Wenruo, "Population Policy," in China's Population:
Problems and Prospects. the China Case Studies Series
(Beijing, China: New World Press, 1981), 56.
30Ibid. , 58.
31Ibid. , 60.
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Chinese, and anyone advocating population control measures was
derisively labeled "bourgeois Malthusian.1,32 After the 1958
Great Leap Forward commenced, peasants were busy producing
poor-quality backyard steel. They had little time to harvest
their crops? in the ensuing "Great Leap Famine," fertility
dropped

dramatically.33

Thus

the

government's

renewed

emphasis on "the more, the better," from the late 1950s to the
early 1960s becomes a bit more comprehensible.
In 1962, there was another population policy reversal.
The State Committee again called on localities to provide
education about family planning and, for the first time, to
produce and supply adequate amounts of free contraceptive
devices.

Abortion and sterilization were also made

easier to obtain.34

still

Propaganda complemented this renewed

interest in population control,

and the government warned

young people of the consequences of early marriage: men would
dissipate their bodily fluids and women would endanger their
own health as well as the health of their child. The press
promoted the two-child family ideal, and tried to popularize

32Ibid. , 62.

33Please
see
Judith
Bannister,
China1s
Changing
Population. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1987), 59; and also Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Fertility Trends
in China," in The Population of Modern China, ed. Dudley L.
Poston, Jr., and David Yaukey (New York: Plenum Press, 1992),
278.
34H o u Wenr u o ,

63.
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a variety of contraceptive alternatives.35
Yet this interest in population control was also short
lived. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), population
control
though,

efforts

ceased.36

soon undercut

Unbridled

improvements

population

in urban

growth,

housing

and

education. Population policy commanded more attention after
1970. By 1974, Mao had re-emphasized that population numbers
must be controlled, and the regime made family planning a
citizen

duty

in

the

Fifth

National

Peoples'

Congress.37

Throughout the mid- and late 1970s, the Chinese government
began to offer numerous incentives for family planning, such
as resuming to supply free contraception and offering "sick
leave"

for abortions

or

sterilizations.38

However,

this

renewed interest in population control throughout the 1970s
had a darker side as well: As in India, local authorities
became trapped between targets mandated by the center

(to

reduce China's population growth rate to 1 per 100 by 1980)
and the impossibility of achieving this target by voluntary
measures alone. Thus there is much doubt about how "voluntary"
the steep rise in IUD insertions (1971— 6 million, 1973— 14

35Bannister, 150.
36H o u

Wenruo, 64.

37Ibid. , 6 6 .

38Penny Kane, The Second Billion: Population and Family
Planning in China (Ringwood, Victoria, Australia: Penguin
Books Australia, Ltd., 1987), 81.
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million, 1975— 17 million) really was throughout the 1970s.39
In

1979

single-child

the government
family.40

initiated

Despite

its call

early mixed

for the

signals

from

government and Party about the seriousness of this policy, the
significance of a particularly strong statement in June 1982
by Premier Zhao Ziyang

(re-emphasizing strict controls on

second births, and the prevention of third births "by all
effective means")
authorities.41

was not lost upon provincial and local
The

Center

effectively

placed

these

authorities in an even tighter bind than they had faced in the
1970s. In this political atmosphere, authorities no longer had
to monitor unauthorized pregnancies or waste time "counseling"
women to have abortions? instead, they increasingly opted for
the permanent birth control that India had promoted in the
1970s.

Sterilization increased sharply in 1983 (80% of those

sterilized

were

female), much

of

which

was

reportedly

coercive.42
A more moderate approach to population policy began in
1984. The regime allowed more "exceptions" to the one-child
rule, publicly disavowed coercive tactics, and decided to base
family planning work on

"local

conditions."

Aside

from

39John S. Aird, Slaughter of the Innocents: Coercive Birth
Control in China (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise
Institute Press, 1990), 26.
40Kane, 186.
41Ibid., 93? also, Aird, 33.
42Ibid.
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upsetting

the

masses,

coercive

tactics

were

rather

incompatible with the rural "responsibility policy,” which
dismantled collectivized agriculture and gave incentives to
peasants to produce more (children are thus seen as hands, not
mouths) .43

Many

authorities

took

this

"relaxation"

as

effectively abolishing the one-child rule? this impression was
further underscored by a 1988 decision to let some rural
couples have a second child if the first was a girl.44

A New but Reliable Contender:

Thailand’s Policy

Unlike China or India, Thailand did not implement any
kind

of

Indeed,

official
by

the

population
1950s,

control

policy until

Thailand’s government

had

1970.45
held

a

pronatalist population policy for half of a century. Even
while China and India lurched toward population planning in
hesitant steps, Thailand continued as recently as 1956 to
offer bonuses for large families. The government reconsidered
its position after a 1959 World Bank mission issued a report
on the demographic situation in Thailand. The report suggested
that a pronatalist policy could seriously hinder economic

43Ibid., 18, 33.
44Ibid., 18.

45Sidney Goldstein, "The Demography of Bangkok: The Case
of a Primate City," in Population. Politics, and the Future in
South Asia, ed. W. Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot (New
York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 96.
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development plans.46
Shortly

thereafter,

the

government

appointed

study

committees and then sponsored several national population
seminars after 1963. These early investigative efforts into
the population issue culminated in a 1964 pilot project in a
rural

district

Bangkok.47

some

Throughout

fifty
the

miles

rest

of

from
the

the
1960s,

capital
the

of
Thai

government took steps to make birth control information more
accessible to women who wanted it, even though it did not
officially endorse population planning and birth control until
1970.

Furthermore,

it allowed missionary hospitals in the

rural north to use injectable contraceptives after 1966.48
The government focused much of its initial activity, however,
in the hospitals and clinics of Greater Bangkok.49 There, the
government instituted postpartum programs for permanent or
semi-permanent

contraception

(IUDs,

female

sterilization)

immediately after giving birth.50
In 1968 the government created a population taskforce
within the National Economic and Social Development Board, and

46John Knodel, Apichat Chamratrithirong, Nibhon Debavalya,
Thailand's Reproductive Revolution: Fertility Decline in a
Third World Setting (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1987), 173.
47Ibid. , 174.
48Ibid. , 175.
49Goldstein, 99.
50Knodel, 175.
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delegated to it the task of issuing a final recommendation on
the population question. The taskforce's research, combined
with the efforts of the Ministry of Public Health and the
National Research Council, resulted in the 1970 declaration by
the Thai cabinet that the new, formal population policy would
be to slow population growth.51
In

accordance

with

the

new

policy,

the

government

established the official National Family Planning Program to
coordinate voluntary family planning efforts in Thailand.
Throughout the next several years, the antinatalist population
policy remained in place despite changes of government? a
clause in the new 1974 constitution enshrined the importance
of population matters to the welfare of the Thai people.52
Because of the preliminary moves toward dissemination of
information about birth control in the late 1960s, public
health

personnel

in

most

provinces

already

had

some

familiarity or training in family planning. Furthermore, many
family planning

services

were

placed

directly

under

the

Ministry of Public Health after 1970. Thereafter, the Ministry
integrated its existing extensive infrastructure of child and
51Ibid. , 174.

52Mya Saw Shin discusses the 1974 constitution at length
in The Constitutions of Thailand (Washington, D.C.: Law
Library of the Library of Congress, 1981), 52-55, microfiche.
Articles 27-53 describe the rights of the Thai people?
Articles 54-61, the Thai people's duties; and Articles 62-94,
a list of "directive principles" for the regime, which
includes an assurance that a population policy "consistent
with Thailand's level of economic and social development" will
be implemented.
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maternal health centers with the family planning services.53
After the promulgation of the 1970 policy, the Ministry
of Public Health expanded the postpartum program of

IUD

insertion and sterilization beyond Bangkok to its regional
hospitals

and

clinics.

Injectable

contraceptives

gained

widespread use in government hospitals and clinics after 1975.
Also increasingly prevalent in the 1970s was a Thai-pioneered
female sterilization procedure that required little in the way
of elaborate equipment or technical training. After 1976, the
government eliminated the nominal charges associated with this
procedure as well as with IUD insertion and oral contraceptive
prescriptions.

In

the

1980s,

a

long-acting

subdermal

contraceptive has been piloted within the National Family
Planning Program, although sterilization has become the most
emphasized procedure in the program's educational campaign.54
Since 1971, the government has supplemented this hospitaland

clinic-approach

to

family planning with

a

community

extension strategy that allows trained nurses and midwives to
distribute oral contraceptives through 3,500 health stations,
which are more accessible to the rural population than the 350
government-sponsored health clinics. Village health volunteers
are now permitted the pill-distribution function as well. By

53Margaret Wolfson, Changing Approaches to Population
Problems, Development Centre Study Series (Paris, France:
Development Center of the Organization for Economic CoOperation and Development with the World Bank, 1978), 77.
4

54Knodel, 175, 177.
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1983, the Ministry of Public Health instituted a program to
train the nurses and midwives in administering injectable
contraceptives, further augmenting the role of the villagelevel health-care providers.55

Reading Between the Lines: Japan's "Policy11
On the crowded islands of Japan, the population question
emerged as a policy issue rather earlier than in the other
Asian case studies under consideration. The Tanaka Cabinet
appointed a Commission on Population and Food as early as
1927. Among its recommendations was a "reasonable” diffusion
of information and contraceptives. However, the Commission's
other recommendations reflected the tenor of the times in
Japan. Aside from population control through voluntary family
planning, the Commission also urged external colonization.56
Throughout the 1930s, Japan's government remained lax in
its enforcement of anti-abortion laws. Concurrently, though,
the Japanese leadership fretted about the downward drift in
fertility from industrialization and urbanization, both of
which

stemmed

in large part

from militarization.

If the

downward drift continued, the leadership feared, Japan might
lose the

abundance of manpower that

enabled and

excused

55Ibid. , 176.

56Irene B. Taeuber, The Population of Japan (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), 366.
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military expansion.57 Japan's

leadership linked population

growth to a "grand project," just as post-Revolutionary China
later would:

it was argued that building the Greater East

Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere would both require and provide for
as many Japanese as possible.
The Allied victory in the Pacific War crushed immediate
hopes for establishing a Japanese-lead economic order in East
Asia, for Japan's own economy and politics were in disarray.
The islands were occupied by a foreign power, and Japan could
not secure markets for manufactured goods or find sources of
raw materials.58 Despite the loss of a significant portion of
the marriageable male cohort, by 1947 fertility remained quite
high, a result of years of pre-war and wartime socialization
efforts.59 Given the impossibility of territorial expansion,
the

density

of

population,

and

the

need

for

capital

accumulation to rebuild the economic base of the islands, the
Japanese leadership, with the tacit approval of the occupation
authorities,

moved

toward

an

unofficial

antinatalist

population policy in the late 1940s.60
The solution emerged in the form of a modification of the
1940 National Eugenic Law. As revised in 1948, it effectively
57Ibid., 266.

58Robert W. Hodge and Naohiro Ogawa, Fertility Change in
Contemporary Japan. Population and Development Series
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1.
59Taeuber, 369.
60Taeuber, 369; also Hodge and Ogawa, 2.
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legalized abortion, contraception, and sterilization in Japan,
although the 1948 law and the revisions to it were advanced
primarily as measures to eliminate inferior descendants and
protect some women from the health hazards of pregnancy. The
first provision of the 1948 legislation regulated voluntary—
and in some cases compulsory— sterilization if particular
hereditary or infectious diseases were present in the parents.
Later revisions to this section allowed sterilization for
maternal health reasons. The second provision of the 1948 law
permitted

abortions

subject

to

the

discretion

of the

physician, the wishes of the woman and her spouse, and, in
some cases,

the approval of the local Eugenic Protection

Committee.

This

justification

second

under

economic criteria.

provisionrequired

broadly-defined

maternal

nominal
health

or

The Eugenic Protection Committees were

eliminated after a 1952 revision to this section of the
legislation.61

Finally,

the

third

provision

of

the

1948

Eugenics Law effectively legalized contraception, which had
been illegal to discuss before and during World War II .62 The
government

gave physicians (and later, licensed nurses and

midwives)

in

contraceptive

Public

Health

assistance

and

Centers
the

responsibility for
dissemination

of

61Ibid., 269.

62Carl Mosk, Patriarchy and Fertility; Japan and Sweden.
1880-1960. Population and Social Structure Series (New York,
New York: Academic Press, 1983), 200.
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information.63
Throughout

the

period

of

the

late

1940s,

various

I commissions and committees made inquiries and recommendations
4

on the population problem in Japan, while the government still
eschewed

official

committee,

the

population

Population

control

Planning

policy.

One

Committee,

such

favored

strengthening the compulsory sections of the 1948 National
Eugenics Law in order to improve "quality," but the government
ignored

its

recommendations.

Although

the

government’s

official measures continued to be linked medical and eugenic
reasons, it increasingly made its position clear on the need
to

limit

the

growth

rate.

From

1947

to

1950

the

Prime

Minister's Statistics Bureau reminded the Japanese public of
the

islands'

high number of births,

their low number of

deaths, and the size of their population versus the size of
the labor force.64
By the mid-1950s, most ordinary Japanese had knowledge
of the new, unrestrictive abortion laws and the clinics in
which one could secure abortion or contraceptive services.65
People had availed themselves of the services to such degree
that the government began to worry about halting the decline
in

fertility.66 In the
63Taeuber, 270.

^Ibid., 372-373.
65Mosk, 201.

^Taeuber, 375.

decade

after

1947

the

government
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witnessed the dramatic 50% decrease in the crude birthrate,
and by 1957 a replacement level of fertility was achieved.
Ever since the late 1950s, fertility has fluctuated over a
very narrow range; the annual rate of population growth has
remained just above or below 1.0 per 100 people, and since
1975-1976,
Thus

the

has tended toward below
Japanese

government

has

1.0 per
not

100 people.67

needed

elaborate

strategies for population control as have the governments of
China, India, and Thailand.

Lower Population Growth Rates:
Is Coercion the Kev?
Here I will attempt to assess the performance of these
four population control efforts. Aside from the independent
variable of political coercion in these policies,

I will

*

consider the role that several other variables might play in
decreasing rates of population growth. For India, China, and
Thailand, I have gathered population data from 1963 to 1991,
a period of twenty-eight years. For Japan, the relevant data
are from an earlier period, pre-World War II up until 1960, a
period of forty years. From the data sets of each state, I
have also calculated an annual growth rate of the population.
I will now consider whether political coercion or some other
variable best explains the results within and across cases. If
67Hodge and Ogawa, 1? and Yuki Miura, ed., Japan
Statistical Yearbook 1987. Volume 37 (Tokyo, Japan: The
Statistics Bureau of the Japanese Management Coordination
Agency, 1987), 24-25.

reported political coercion correlates with lower rates of
population increase, then we must consider the consequences
for keeping population numbers in check in a democratizing
world.
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Table I
Annual Rate of Population Growth
in China. India, and Thailand
China
Year

Pop.
in
Mill.

India

Annual
Growth
Rate
per
100
people

Pop.
in
Mill.

1963

691.7

1964

705.0

1.922

472.1

1965

725.4

2.894

1966

745.4

2.757

1967

763.7

2.455

Annual
Growth
Rate
per
100
people

462.0

Thailand
Pop.
in
Mill.

Annual
Growth
Rate
per
100
people

28.5
2.186

30.1

5.543

482.7

2.240

31.0

3.158

493.4

2.213

32.0

3.126

504.3

2.219

33.0

3.125

1968

785.3

2.828

515.6

2.233

34.0

3.152

1969

806.7

2.725

527.2

2.246

35.1

3.143

1970

829.9

2.876

539.1

2.257

36.4

3.589

I 1971

852.3

2.699

551.2

2.254

37.5

3.079

1972

871.8

2.288

563.5

2.231

38.6

2.934

1973

892.1

575.9

2.193

39.7

2.850

1974

908.6

2.329
1.850

588.3

2.155

40.8

2.746

1975

924.2

1.717

600.7

2.118

41.9

2.678

1976

937.2

1.407

613.3

2.082

43.0

2.603

1977

949.0

1.259

625.8

2.046

44.0

2.514

1978

962.2

1.370

646.0

3.225

45.1

2.407

1979

975.4

1.330

660.0

2.167

46.1

2.306

675.0

2.273

46.7

1.257

1980

996.1

2.122

1981

1008.4

1.235

690.0

2.222

47.7

2.183

1982

1020.6

1.210

705.0

2.174

48.7

2.032

1983

1032.9

1.205

720.0

2.128

49.7

1.991

1984

1045.8

1.229

736.0

2.270

50.6

1.932

1985

1059.5

1.310

750.9

2.019

51.6

1.856

1986

1074.1

1.378

766.1

2.035

52.5

1.803

1987

1089.6

1.452

781.4

1.988

53.4

1.752

1988

1105.8

1.487

796.6

1.949

54.3

1.684

1989

1122.4

1.501

1.911

55.2

1.620

1990

1139.1

1.488

811.8
827.1

1.876

56.1

1.576

1991

1155.8

1.466

849.6

2.731

56.9

1.498

Source: The International Monetary Fund Statistics Department,
The International Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington,
D.C.: The International Monetary Fund, 1992), 2 8 O7 2 8 I, 408409, 578-579; annual growth rate calculated by author.
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Table II
Annual Rate of Population Growth in Japan
Japan
Yaar

Pop. in Mill.

Annual
Qrowth
Rata par 100
paopla

1920

56.0

1921

56.7

1.250

1922

57.4

1.235

1923

58.1

1.220

1924

58.9

1.377

192S

59.7

1.358

1926

60.7

1.675

1927

61.7

1.647

1928

62.6

1.459

1929

63.8

1.438

1930

64.5

1.575

1931

68.8

1.850

1932

66.4

1.374

1933

67.4

1.806

1934

68.3

1.338

1938

69.3

1.464

1936

70.1

1.118

1937

70.6

.713

1938

71.0

.567.

1939

. 71.4

.563

1940

71.9

.700

1941

72.2

.417

1942

72.9

.970

1943

73.9

1.371

1944

74.4

1946

72.1

.677
-3.09

1946

78.8

8.132

1947

78.1

3.034

1948

80.0

2.433

1949

81.8

2.250

19S0

83.2

1.711

1981

84.8

1.563

1952

88.8

1.538

1953

87.0

1.399

1954

88.2

1.379

1955

89.3

1.247

1956

90.2

1.008

1957

90.9

.776

1958

91.8

.990

1959

92.6

.871

1960

93.4

.864

Source: Yuki Miura, ed., Japan Statistical Abstract 1987,
Volume 37 (Tokyo, Japan: The Statistical Bureau of the
Japanese Management Coordination Agency, 1987), 23-25; annual
growth rate calculated by author.
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Coercion correlates well with the population growth rates
observed for China and India in Table One.
China's

rate

of population

Specifically,

growth decreased

dramatically

during the first interval of coercive tactics (approximately
1971-1979), and the second interval (approximately 1981-1984).
India's

growth

rate

Emergency period

also

noticeably

(1975-1977),

dropped

during

the

when Indira Ghandi's regime

resorted to coercive tactics. On the other hand, it is also
obvious that other independent variables are operating as
well; they will be considered in turn.

The Coercion Connection
More generally,

both China and India have generally

experienced decreasing rates of population growth during the
periods in which they have had population control policies.
Furthermore, when analyzed in light of the role of coercion in
the programs' respective histories, the rates generally rose
fell

when

one

would

expect,

relative

to

the

degree

of

coercion.
In

China,

for

example,

after

the

beginning

of

the

Cultural Revolution, there was a rise in population growth
rates

until

1970,

reflecting

the

abandonment

of

family

planning efforts. Then, throughout the 1970s, one witnesses
the steady drop from the increase of 2.69 per 100 people per
year (1970-71) to 1.33 per 100 people per year (1978-79) as
local authorities relentlessly and coercively pursued a 1980
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target growth rate of 1.0 per 100 people per year. After the
one-child policy began to be pursued in earnest in the early
1980s, growth rates continued this steep decline, dipping to
around 1.20 and 1.22 per 100 people per year in the years of
highest coercion, in the early- to mid-1980s. Interestingly,
the exceptional interval in the history of China*s policy
falls in 1980, after the announcement of the one-child policy.
Nevertheless, in the first few years of the new decade, the
political elite remained indecisive and divided about the
future of the one-child policy in particular and about family
planning in general. Nevertheless, a hardline position soon
prevailed after 1981-1982, and growth rates continued their
steep decline.

Predictably,

the

growth

rates

have

risen

somewhat with the relaxations of the one-child policies in
1984 and in 1988.'
In India, one sees that the strictly voluntary programs
pursued throughout the 1960s had seemingly little effect, with
the rate of growth remaining around 2.2 per 100 people per
year. As sterilization centers and mobile units became more
common in the early 1970s, the rates dipped? then they reached
a new low (expectedly) during the excesses of the 1975-77
Emergency period.
After the Emergency, 1978 brought a notable increase in
the Indian growth rate, probably a reaction to the coercive
policies of the Emergency period. Despite a lack of coercive
tactics, growth rates began a new slide almost immediately.
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This suggests other independent variables are at work in the
Indian case.
The data

for Thailand do not

suggest a correlation

between levels of political coercion and the population growth
rates, as no coercive measures have been reported. Indeed, the
data suggest that Thailand is a case where strictly voluntary
measures have had remarkable effect in moderating population
growth rate over a twenty-year interval. Japan also succeeded
in achieving a decreased population growth rate without any
reports of widespread government-sponsored coercive tactics,
but the uniqueness of Japan's historical circumstances must be
taken into account: it only had to reverse a growth rate that
had been manipulated upward by pre-War socialization. Thus,
both the Thai and Japanese cases also suggest that one should
consider several other independent variables, in addition to
political coercion. Some suggested variables are considered in
turn below.

Structural Characteristics of the Programs
Another possible

explanation

for variation

in data

across cases is how the programs were structured and managed,
setting aside the variable of coercive tactics. In all of the
cases,

governments

implemented

the

population

policy

by

devolving much authority to local authorities: none of these
programs were micro-managed from the Center.

In China and

India, the Center only set the targets, and granted great

43

leeway to local authorities.

On the other hand, in Thailand

and Japan, little or no emphasis was placed upon setting and
meeting specific regional and local targets. Yet the Thai and
Japanese programs also placed great authority in the hands of
local

actors

(individual physicians

in Japan,

most

local

health personnel in Thailand). Thus, all governments in this
survey

structured

their

population

initiatives

in

a

decentralized fashion over the periods in the data sets? it
seems unlikely that structural characteristics of the program
(extent

of

centralization

versus

decentralization,

for

example) provide one with additional explanatory variables.

Urbanization/Industrialization
The

inseparable

industrialization

provide

explanation for the data.
urbanization

and

phenomena
another
Indeed,

industrialization

of

urbanization

intuitively

and

satisfying

available statistics on
in

these

four

states

suggest that these variables have contributed to the observed
population growth rates.
Traditional agricultural families have always tended to
want more children than urban families, to assure enough hands
to work the land and provide a measure of "social security" to
parents in old age .68 Three of the states in this study had
^The World Bank Staff, Population Change and Economic
Development. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 71?
see also Song Jian, "Population Development: Goals and Plans,"
in China’s Population: Problems and Prospects. The China Case
Study Series (Beijing, China: New World Press, 1981), 22? and
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relatively.low levels of urbanization in 1970, but have seen
significant urbanization since then. In 1970, 13% of the Thai
people lived in cities, as did 20% and 17% of the Indian and
Chinese populations, respectively. By 1990, an additional 10%
of Thais dwelt in cities, making the total portion of urban
inhabitants 23%. By 1990, China had swept past India in urban
population: 56% of its inhabitants were urban, as compared to
only 27% of India*s.
Table III
Urban Population of China. India, and Thailand

Year

China
% urban

India
% urban

Thailand
% urban

1970

17

20

13

1990.

56

27

23

Source: The World Bank Staff, World Tables 1993 (Baltimore,
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 184-187, 320323, 594-595.
Given the natural tendency of urban populations to have
smaller families, and that state propaganda possibly reaches
an urban population more effectively than a rural one, the
variable of urbanization might help explain the data observed
for India, China, and Thailand: as urbanization increased,
rates of population growth rates tended to decrease. It seems
plausible that a process of urbanization and industrialization
over the last two decades provided an independent brake on

Sripati Chandrasekhar, Infant Mortality. Population Growth,
and Family Planning in India (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1972), 252.
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population growth,

concurrent to the waxing and waning of

coercive tactics in China and India. It also helps explain the
continued

decreases

Emergency)

in

growth

rates

India and Thailand,

observed

in

(post-

where there have been no

reports of coercive tactics.
Indeed, this additional variable is also most helpful in
explaining the earlier data from Japan. Increased urbanization
and

industrialization,

themselves

a

result

of

increased

militarization in the decades before World War II, prompted
the Japanese leadership’s call for increased procreation among
Japanese

in the

population

was

1930s.
already

Indeed,
33%

by the mid-1930s Japan's

urban,

and

approached

40%

immediately after Japan's defeat and occupation.
Table IV
Urban Population of Japan
Year

% Urban

1935

32.9

1945

41.1

1955

56.3

1965

68.0

1975

75.7

1985

76.7

Sources: United Nations Statistical Office, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 1960 Demographic Yearbook (New
York, New York: The United Nations, 1960), 383. Figures
exclude allied Occupation Forces. From same office, see 1970
Demographic Yearbook (New York, New York: The United Nations,
1970), 145. For post-1970 data, see World Bank Staff, World
Tables 1993 (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1992), 350-351.
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That the population was already so urban in comparison to
the other cases suggests why the Japanese government could
drastically reduce growth rates in such a short period without
resorting to coercive tactics:

a population so urban would

need less convincing, particularly in the face of economic
disruptions, that smaller families were again a better idea.
Moreover, this conclusion is supported by Japan*s success at
keeping annual population growth rates around 1.0 per 100
people

since

the

1950s:

by

1965,

the population

of the

Japanese islands was 68% urban, and the figure has stabilized
around roughly 75% since the 1970s.
Across the four cases, the process of urbanization (and
related industrialization) seems to be a variable with good
explanatory power when considered in light of these data. One
final note to those who would might suggest that urbanization
is the only variable one needs to explain these data: most of
China*s significant increases in urbanization took place in
the 1980-1990 interval of the 1970-1990 period, well after the
first reports— and effects— of coercive population control
tactics. It seems, then, that rate of urbanization alone could
not fully explain the observed data.69

69Please see World Bank Staff, World Tables 1993
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992),
186-187.
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Methods of Family Planning Promoted
Did

the

program

of

one

country

promote

particular

measures of birth control whose success could effectively
explain the data? As indicated in the brief outline I gave of
the histories of population control in these Asian states, all
countries generally have encouraged permanent— or at least
long-acting— contraception of minimal complexity. Such methods
have included IUDs (India, late 1960s? China, 1970s; Thailand
1970s-present), sterilization

(India,

1970s;

China,

early

1980s? Thailand, 197Os-present), and injectable, subdermal,
and

oral

Moreover,

contraception
abortion,

(Thailand,

mid-197Os-present).

a particularly effective

(if to somie,

including many of the Japanese population commissions, morally
unsettling) form of birth control has been central to at least
two of the programs (Japan, 1950s; China, early 1980s).70 Of
these

long-acting

or

permanent

methods,

only

oral

contraception requires more than a periodic procedure, but
Thailand

has

clearly

supplemented

the

role

of

oral

contraception with other methods. Thus it seems unlikely that
the

effectiveness

of particular

contraceptive

devices

or

procedures could explain the data observed in this four-state
assessment.

70The Japanese population scholars' distaste for abortion
is well documented in Taeuber, 375.
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Empowerment of Female Population
Another potential explanatory variable is the social,
political, and economic status of women in these four Asian
states. Studies often suggest a connection between a cluster
of interrelated empowerment issues (education, literacy, and
status)

and better use of family planning facilities and

practices.71

As basic indicators of the relative status of

women in these societies, I will use the percentage of female
population enrolled in secondary school and rates of female
illiteracy.
From 1970 to 1990, female enrollment in secondary school
grew in Thailand, India, and China. In India, enrollment in
secondary education of the relevant age group increased from
15%

to

33%.

An

almost

identical

upswing

is

evident

in

Thailand, which in the same period increased enrollment from
15% to 32%. Data on China is not available for 1970, but by
1990, 41% of females in the relevant age group were enrolled
in secondary education.72 Despite the lack of earlier data on
China, it seems that there is an inverse relationship between
secondary schooling and the rate of population growth over the
1970-1990 period.

71Marcela Ballara, Women and Literacy. Women and World
Development Series (New Jersey: Zed Books Limited, 1992), 13.
72The World Bank Staff, The World Development Report 1993
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993),
294-295.
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To assess the status of women across the four cases, the
most

recent

estimates

of

female

illiteracy

are

helpful

additional indicators. Female illiteracy above age 15 were 66%
in

India,

38%

in China,

and

a

surprisingly

low

10%

in

Thailand.73 Given the similar increase of Thailand and India
in

secondary

enrollment,

the

difference

in

the

female

illiteracy rates is somewhat surprising, yet the remarkable
Thai illiteracy rate might be attributable to an unusually
successful system of primary education.74
Taken together, these educational indicators suggest that
women are relatively more empowered in Thailand (increased
enrollment, very low illiteracy) and China (higher enrollment
than the other states, literacy in between the other states)
than

in

India

illiteracy). By

(increased
the

logic

enrollment,
of

the

but

very

empowerment

high

variable,

population growth rate should be more resistant to reduction
in India than in China and Thailand. Indeed, this has been the
case.
This

variable

also

holds

explanatory power

for

the

earlier data on Japan as well. In the aftermath of World War
II,

American

educational

advisors

recommended

a

radical

^The World Bank Staff, Social Indicators of Development
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press) , 71,
153, 227.
740n the subject of the state of Thai primary'education,
please see uWho*s Nicst?” The Economist. 13 August 1994, 31.
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restructuring

of

traditional

Japanese

education.75

One

component of this reform was a conscious decision to reduce
! gender inequities in schools; this policy decision held even
after the departure of the Occupation forces. As such, the
percentage of girls entering upper secondary levels has risen
from

37%

in

1950

to

56%

in

1960

and

to

83%

in

1970,

correlating with a decrease in population growth rates. This
enrollment rate has remained around 95% since 1979, and by
1984, Japan achieved a female literacy rate of 97%.76 If the
logic of the empowerment argument is correct, the remarkable
the strides in female enrollment in the 1950s and 1960s should
correlate with decreases in the rate of population growth,
which they do. Additionally,

these enrollment figures,

in

conjunction with the high rate of female literacy attained by
the 1980s, would suggest that Japan should have a noticeably
lower rate of population increase than any of the other cases;
indeed, this proves true. The case of Japan, then, supports
the possibility that

female empowerment

is an additional

explanatory variable in controlling population growth.

75Edward R. Beauchamp, "The Development of Japanese
Educational Policy," in Windows on Japanese Education ed.
Edward R. Beauchamp (New York, New York: Greenwood Press,
1991), 29-30.
76Please see Kumiko Fuj imara-Fanselow and Anne E. Imamura,
"The Education of Women in Japan," in Windows on Japanese
Education ed. Edward R. Beauchamp (New York, New York:
Greenwood Press, 1991), 234; and George Thomas Kurian, The New
Book of World Rankings (New York, New York: Facts on File,
Inc., 1984), 358.
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Another Test of the Variables: Fertility Rates
I have used population growth rates in my
the

population

statistics

policies

are

probably

to this point,

for

the most readily

analysis of
population

accessible

and

understandable figures. On the other hand, total fertility
rates in some ways are a better measure by which to judge the
success of these four programs, or ascertain the role coercion
has played in achieving program targets. Here I will

consider

this other measure; does it bring one to the same conclusions
about the role of coercion and the other four independent
variables considered above? If it does, then my conclusions
about

the

roles

variables will

and

relationships

of

these

independent

be supported by two different statistical

measures.
The utility of using total fertility rates as a measure
stems from their specificity; they measure the average number
of children born alive to a- woman during her lifetime if she
were to bear children in accordance with prevailing agespecific birth rates. Thus, the total fertility rate factors
out emigration and changing death rates, two obvious phenomena
that could skew the accuracy of using population growth rates
to measure population policy*s effectiveness. Using this more
sophisticated

indicator,

can

one

arrive

at

the

same

conclusions about the independent variables discussed above?
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Table V
Total Fertility Rates in China. India, and Thailand
Year

•
CM

n

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

China's
Fertil. Rate
5.1
4.9
4.4
3.8
3.4
2.9
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.3
2.2
2.3
2.2
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.4

India's
Fertil.Rate
5.7
5.6
5.5
5.4
5.0
5.3
5.2
5.4
5.0
5.0
4.9
4.8
4.7
4.6
4.4
4.3
4.2
4.1
4.1
4.0
3.9

Thailand's
Fertil. Rate
5.2
5.0
4.9
4.7
4.6
4.4
4.3
4.1
4.0
3.8
3.7
3.5
3.3
3.1
2.9
2.8
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.4
2.3

Source: World Bank Staff, World Tables 1993 (Baltimore,
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 186-187, 321322, 594-595.
In light of this demographic indicator, the effects of
the three variables cited above still appear to hold. In China
and India, reports of coercive policy correlate with decreased
fertility

rates

in the

same periods

that decreases were

evident in the population growth rates. In China's case, the
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dramatic and coercive increase of IUD insertions in the 1970s
succeeded in quickly lowering the total fertility rate from
5.1

to

2.3— a

steeper

decline

than

India

or

Thailand

experienced in that era. India's fertility rates, however, do
appear to have dropped during its program's brief coercive
interlude (1975-1977). That interval is sandwiched by higher
Indian fertility rates in 1974 and 1978. After a brief respite
in the early 1980s when the Chinese government and Party
articulated a less consistent message on population control,
China's

fertility

rates

continued

to

decline

as

local

authorities clamped down on second births.

Then, with the

relaxation

the mid-1980s,

of

the

one-child

policy

after

fertility rates have crept back upward, seeming to level out
around

2.4

or

2.5.

All

of these

correlations were

also

suggested by the population growth rate analysis performed
above.
The forces of urbanization and industrialization seem to
be confirmed by these data as well.

For instance,

while

India's fertility rates seem to correspond reports of coercive
tactics (1975-1977), they also continued to drop during the
1980s,

suggesting

the

presence

urbanization/industrialization.

of

other

forces

such

as

Furthermore, the relatively

more dramatic decreases in Chinese total fertility rates could
be the result of a more rapid urbanization,

as discussed

above. Finally, as Thailand's urbanization has increased, its
total fertility rate has fallen; this also seems <to confirm
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the inverse relationship between the two variables that I
posited above.
From comparative data on the socioeconomic status of
women— a third plausible independent variable— I suggested
that women would be relatively more empowered in Thailand
(increased enrollment, very low illiteracy) and China (higher
enrollment than the other states,

literacy in between the

other states) than in India (increased enrollment, but very
high illiteracy). Thus, the effects observed with the other
measure (population growth rates) do seem to be validated by
this measure as well, at least in the Chinese, Indian, and
Thai cases.
Japanese
centrality

' of

fertility
two

of

rates
these

appear

to

confirm

the

variables— urbanization/

industrialization and female empowerment. At the same time,
the regime's pre-War pronatalism explains the lack of coercive
tactics, for fertility rates— just as the population growth
rates discussed above— were artificially inflated by regime
propaganda before and during the War. As Taeuber has noted,
Japan

reaped

the

most

dramatic

results

of

pronatalist

socialization after World War II, with the demobilization of
young men who had been bombarded with pronatalist messages for
most of their lives.77

^Taeuber,

369.
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Table VI
Total Fertility Rate in Japan
Years
1945-50
1950-55
1955-60
1960-65
1965-70
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90

Japan's Fertilitv Rate
2.13
2.70
2.07
2.02
2.00
2.06
1.81
1.76
1.70

Source: Nathan Keyfitz and Wilhelm Fleiger, World Population:
Demographic Trends in the Late Twentieth Century (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 222.
A

pattern

emerges

here

that

is

similar to

the

one

observed in the data on Japanese population growth rates. The
highest recorded total fertility in Japan occurred shortly
after World War II, in 1950-55. As the post-War regime moved
toward an antinatalist policy with the National Eugenics Law
and

its revisions,

decreases

in

its

Japan was able to realize very quick
fertility

rates

over

the

next

several

decades, without ever implementing a truly coercive population
policy. Total fertility rates seem to confirm the role of
urbanization/industrialization

and

female

empowerment

in

curtailing population momentum. Japanese women, for example,
have made greater strides than have those in China, Thailand,
and

(most

certainly)

India

in

the

post-War

era.

The

empowerment variable, in conjunction with the existing high
levels of pre-War urbanization in Japan, no doubt meant that
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dramatic reductions in fertility could be realized with noncoercive population policy.
Thus,
policy,

a more

total

sophisticated

fertility rate,

indicator of population

effectiveness

supports

the

conclusions drawn above from using a less elaborate indicator,
annual

rate of population growth.

confident
zation,

that

and

coercive

female

policy,

empowerment

Thus we may be

fairly

urbanization/industriali
are

critical

independent

variables, driving both population and fertility indicators.

Conclusions: Three Important
Independent Variables
Of the variables considered above, the most plausible for
explaining the results within and across cases are (1) the
presence of political coercion,

(2) degree of urbanization/

industrialization, and (3) level of female empowerment. Yet
the nature of the interrelationships among these variables
should also be assessed. To this end I will consider these
three variables in light of the broadest trends observed in
the data.

Program Effectiveness:

Highest Highs to Lowest Lows

I note from Table I that over the years, the results of
India's

population

control

policies

have

been much

less

dramatic than the results of government policy in China,
Thailand, or Japan. By 1991 The Chinese government decreased
the rate of population growth in China from a high of 2.89 to
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1.48 per 100 people per year (difference = 1.41). Since the
government's increased receptivity to antinatalist thinking in
the 1960s, Thailand has realized a notable decrease in rate of
population

growth

from

(difference=4.05).

5.543

Meanwhile,

to

1.498

India's

per

rate

100

of

people

population

growth fell only from 2.24 to 1.88 per 100 people per year
(difference = .36) . Japan's long-term decrease was from a 1945
high

of

5.132

per

100 people per year to

.864

by

1960

(difference= 4.268).
In Table V, fertility decreases break down similarly to
population

growth

rate

reductions,

although

the

total

fertility indicator makes Japan's strides in the post-War
period appear to be less dramatic. Between 1971 and 1991,
Thailand's total

fertility- rates dropped from 5.2 to 2.3

(difference = 2.9); China's, from 5.1 to 2.4 (difference =
2.7); India's, from 5.7 to 3.9 (difference = 1.8). In Table
VI, Japan's total fertility decreased from a high of 2.7 in
the

1950-55

(difference

interval
=

1.0).78

to

1.70

Indeed,

in

the

1985-90

fertility

rates

interval
may

be

"factoring out" the Japanese who returned to Japan after the
collapse of the "Co-Prosperity Sphere." This phenomenon would
not be evident in the population growth rates discussed above.
78For population growth rates in Japan, I used the 194 6-60
interval to measure broadest trends, because population growth
rates level remained consistently around .8 after 1960.
Fertility rates have taken longer to "level off;" as Table VI
indicates, they have decreased in every five-year interval
since 1950. For this reason I have used the interval 1950-1990
to measure broadest trends in fertility rates for Japan.
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Fertility indicators (as opposed to population growth rates)
demonstrate that the magnitude of Japan*s amelioration of the
population crisis was not as great as in the other cases. On
the other hand, by attaining fertility of 2.07 during the
1955-1960

interval,

Japan

reached

a manageable

level

of

fertility that the other states have yet to achieve. It also
started out much further ahead of the other states: Japan's
antinatalist policies began when fertility was at 2.70 rather
than above 5.0, as in the other cases. These facts imply that
Japan's population problem may have never been as pressing as
the ones that continue in China, India, and Thailand. Thus,
its resolution of the population problem would not have to be
of the magnitude necessary in the other cases.

Program Effectiveness: Rapidity of Decreases
Another important measure of any population policy's
effectiveness— in addition to the extent of its reduction of
population growth rates or fertility rates— is the speed with
which sizeable decreases are observed. Table One demonstrates
that China's program decreased the rate of population growth
from 2.699 to 1.330 per 100 people (difference = 1.37) in a
very short nine years (1970-1979). On the other hand, when
Thailand announced its official policy in 1970, the population
was growing at a rate of 3.079 per 100 people per year. It
took eighteen years to realize a decrease, similar to the one
seen in China within the 1970s. Finally, the return to pre-

59

1930s levels of population increase in Japan was accomplished
within about seven years (roughly, 1945-1954).79
Coercion
downward

also

within

a

succeeded
short

in

pushing

fertility

rates

period:

between

1971

1979,

and

fertility rates in China slid from 5.1 to 2.3 (difference =
2.8). In the same interval, the non-coercive Thai policy only
decreased fertility rates from 5.2 to 4.0 (difference = 1.2).
In Thailand,

it took eighteen years to achieve a similar

decrease to the one observed in 1970s China. Meanwhile, India
has

yet

to

achieve

a

similar

swift

decrease

of

2.8

in

fertility rates. Like India, Japan*s reduction in fertility
measures,

meanwhile,

does

not

appear

particularly

rapid

either. Yet if the magnitude of the population problem in
Japan was' not as great as in the other cases, as I suggested
in the above section, then there would not be a need for rapid
reductions in fertility rates.

Imolications
From my consideration of these broad patterns in the
data, I believe that some generalizations are possible about
^Using the pre-1930s figures as a baseline is helpful
because before the 1930s, the Japanese population would not
have been socialized in the ethic of high fertility, which
deliberately pushed the growth rate upward. I also note that
although the data for the 1930s through the early 1940s do not
indicate the success of staunch pronatalism, there was also
massive out-migration from Japan beginning after the 1931
invasion of Manchuria.
The leadership's
"success"
in
socializing high fertility is more evident after the return of
troops and civilians to the Japanese islands following Allied
victory in World War II. Please see Yuki Miura, 24'.
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the roles of these independent variables in determining the
effectiveness of population control policies.
While political coercion, urbanization/industrialization,
and female empowerment all correlate with decreased rates of
population growth and reductions

in fertility rates,

the

variable that correlates best with rapid decreases in the
population growth rate is political coercion.80 The data from
China suggest this relationship: the use of coercive tactics
beginning in the 1970s achieved remarkable results within one
decade. The 1974-1977 interval is particularly striking? a
second "wave" of coercive policy in the early 198 0s pushed
population growth rates and fertility rates even lower before
a policy relaxation in the mid-1980s. Though the effects of
political coercion are most evident in the data for China, in
India,

too,

coercion

pushed

resistant

growth

rates

and

fertility rates to levels that would not recur until the
early- or mid-1980s.
The Thai example supports the notion that coercion has
been

a

sufficient

condition

for

remarkable

short-term

decreases in growth rates. The Thai policy has reaped notable
results without coercion, but these results have been attained
in the longer term. Furthermore, although Japan returned to
its pre-19 30s rate of population growth within seven years and
did so with little or no coercion— seeming to disprove the

80Here I understand "rapid" to mean an interval shorter
than a decade.
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relationship

I

suggest— in

this

case

a

generally

non-

compulsory policy was only reversing an older pronatalist
policy

that

had

artificially

driven

up

growth

rates.

Furthermore, as I noted above, while fertility rates did not
decrease as dramatically as population growth rates did, the
time-series data on fertility do suggest that perhaps Japan's
population problem was not as pressing as in the other states.
Thus,

unique socialization experience and a less pressing

population crisis make it difficult to use the case of Japan
to disprove the relationship I posit between coercion and
short-term decreases in population growth rates and fertility
rates.
The other two independent variables that correlate well
with

decreases

in

the

rate

of

population

growth

were

urbanization/industrialization and female empowerment. Both of
these variables have probably complemented the effects of
China's

program

(coercive)

and

Thailand's

program

(non-

coercive), with the effects of urbanization/industrialization
most pronounced in the former,

and the effects of female

empowerment most pronounced in the latter. The two variables
aid in explaining the relatively less remarkable effects of
India's

population

program

interruption), for India

falls

(non-coercive

with

one

close to Thailand on the

urbanization variable, but appallingly far behind both China
and Thailand on correcting female illiteracy rates. In Japan,
female

empowerment

and

urbanization/industrialization
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doubtless help explain the rapid decline in growth rates
observed in post-War Japan, and the (although less notable)
decreases in fertility rates. Japan after World War II was
already a largely urban and industrial society; with the
revamping and improvement of female education after World War
II,

the

two

variables

complemented

the

effects

of

the

generally non-compulsory Japanese Eugenics Law of 1948 which
liberalized abortion and contraceptive alternatives. Given (1)
Japan*s pre- and post-War strides toward urbanization and
industrialization, (2) its post-War efforts to improve female
education,

(3) that its population policy had been strongly

pronatalist before the war,

and

(4)

the apparently

less

pressing nature of its population problem, one should not be
surprised that coercive measures were never used to attain
rapid decreases in the short-term.

Prospects for Population Planning
in a Democratizing World
What lessons are we to draw from this survey of four
Asian states? Upon examining the data, I suggested that the
independent variables that held the most promising explanatory
power for reducing rates of population growth are urbani
zation/industrialization, policies that empower women, and the
degree of coercion evident in population planning policies.
More specifically,

while all of the suggested independent

variables are linked to declining rates of population growth,
the

presence

of

coercion

in population

control

policies
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appeared to be a sufficient condition for rapid decreases in
population growth rates. The Chinese data demonstrate this
well. Of the case studies, political coercion was present for
a sustained period only in China, and it is the only case—
aside from the unique case of Japan— in which dramatic short
term decreases
Furthermore,

in population growth rates were observed.

Japanese

reduction

in

fertility,

a

more

sophisticated indicator of policy effectiveness, was not as
dramatic.
It is the Thai case that gives hope for population
control

on

a

planet

that

increasingly democratic.

is

increasingly

populous

and

Thailand's history is like much of

the developing world: one of attempts to implement democratic
processes

that

alternate

with

military

coups.81

Despite

Thailand's being less a "model" Third World democracy than
India

(which lapsed only 1975-1977),

all Thai governments

(whether military or elected) have consistently advocated and
implemented voluntary

family planning measures

since

the

inception of that state's population control policy. The Thai
elite has acted more wisely than India's Emergency leadership,
which politicized the family planning issue by using coercive
tactics.

The Thai

experience,

then,

is perhaps

the most

instructive for today's increasingly democratized Third World;
Thailand

fought

"natural"

population

growth

rates

and

81John L. S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981), 104-188.
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fertility rates with voluntary measures.82
Moreover,

while

a

moral

argument

may

be— and

increasingly, will be— advanced against coercive practices in
population planning, Thai case points to a practical argument
against coercion as well. While Thailand began in 1971 with
fertility rates very similar to China, it also had similar
fertility rates in 1991, after twenty years (indeed, Thailand
was slightly ahead: see Table V) . Furthermore,

across the

twenty-seven years of population growth rate data, Thailand's
population growth rate was also quite similar to China's (see
Table I). While coercion in a closed society might be cheaper
than

a well-funded

and

comprehensive population planning

initiative, and achieve dramatic results in the short term, it
did not really put China any further ahead of Thailand by
1991. As the history of the Chinese policy indicated, periods
of

restrictive

and

coercive

population

policy

seemed

invariably to be followed by liberalization and relaxation.
While systematic application of coercion may achieve rapid
decreases

in either population growth rates

or

fertility

rates— as suggested by this analysis— the history of Chinese
policy suggests that coercion itself might only work in the
short term. Even in a closed society, the Chinese case seems
to suggest, there are limits to how long coercion can last
before a reaction sets in (taking the form of dissension among
82This may be understood in contrast to Japan, where the
government only reversed an earlier regime's manipulation of
the growth rate.
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the elite or unrest

in the countryside,

which result

in

relaxation of coercive tactics). In short, while coercion
achieves rapid results in the short term, it may only work in
the short term.
By committing to a non-coercive strategy for controlling
population

growth

in

an

urbanizing

and

industrializing

society, and by implementing educational policies that empower
its female population, the Thai government has made remarkable
progress

within

an

eighteen-year

interval.

observing a similar pattern in 1980s India,

One

may

be

but we might

anticipate that decreases in India's growth rate will remain
sluggish as long as the relative status of women remains so
low.83 Coercion might be a sufficient condition for dramatic
short-term decreases in the rate of population growth, as the
Chinese case indicates; for a democratizing world to effect
population control, however, it will have to rely on wellfunded

and

comprehensive

voluntary

family

planning

initiatives, policies that educate women, and the forces of
urbanization. The moral norms of democratization demand this
strategy; the apparent limitations of coercion as long-term
strategy also recommend it.
83The only exception to the recent decrease in Indian
growth rates is the interval of 1990-1991, where there is a
large and seemingly out-of-place increase in the annual rate
of population growth. Data for the 1992-1994 interval should
clarify whether this is outlying data or a new pattern
emerging. On the other hand, the 1991 total fertility rate for
India was not outlying data, so this apparent aberration might
only be a limitation of using population growth rates as a
measure.

66

What must
measures

be

remembered,

however,

is

that voluntary

(in conjunction with the other two variables of

urbanization/industrialization and female empowerment) appear
to have their effects in the longer term. Probably most would
express a certain satisfaction that coercive tactics may have
practical limitations and will further lose their utility
(through a normative argument) in a more democratic world . On
the other hand, neither should we forget the urgency of the
population

question

underscored

at

the

outset

of

this

discussion: there is evidence that many of the neo-Malthusian
population crises are already here and will not be resolved
easily.

Furthermore,

we can already envision where these

crises might end— politically, ecologically, and economically.
Given the urgency of resolving population-related crises, and
the length of time needed to implement the Thai model, the
real lesson that emerges from this analysis is the importance
of acting immediately to replicate the model elsewhere in the
Third World. Achieving the lower-bound population projections
for 2100 with voluntary measures will be easier if those
measures

are

implemented

sooner

rather

than

later,

for

population numbers carry from within their own momentum. With
the probability— or even possibility— of major disruptions
occasioned by a world of 14 or 15 billion,
importance of such an investment becomes clear.

the enormous
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